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ABSTRACT
In this work we show that Tor is vulnerable to app deanonymization
attacks on Android devices through network traffic analysis. For
this purpose, we describe a general methodology for performing
an attack that allows to deanonymize the apps running on a target
smartphone using Tor, which is the victim of the attack. Then, we
discuss a Proof-of-Concept, implementing the methodology, that
shows how the attack can be performed in practice and allows to
assess the deanonymization accuracy that it is possible to achieve.
While attacks against Tor anonymity have been already gained
considerable attention in the context of website fingerprinting in
desktop environments, to the best of our knowledge this is the first
work that highlights Tor vulnerability to apps deanonymization
attacks on Android devices. In our experiments we achieved an
accuracy of 97%.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Tor is a very popular anonymization network, currently counting
more than two million of daily users [28]. While in desktop environ-
ments Tor is mainly associated with preserving anonymity during
Web navigation, its protection capabilities are not limited to such
application. In general, Tor can be used to protect any TCP-based
traffic. Nowadays, smartphone apps are replacing web browsers for
interacting with many online services, such as social networks, chat
services and video/audio streaming. The usage of anonymization
mechanisms, such as Tor, on mobile devices is motivated by the
increasing interest in profiling mobile users, e.g., for marketing,
governments surveillance, detection and exploitation of vulnera-
bilities and other activities that may be harmful for users’ privacy
and security, or perceived as such by them.
The aim of this work is showing that Tor is vulnerable to app
deanonymization attacks on Android devices through network
traffic analysis. For this purpose, we describe a general methodology
for performing an attack that allows to deanonymize the apps
running on a target smartphone using Tor, which is the victim
of the attack. Then, we discuss a Proof-of-Concept, implementing
the methodology, that shows how the attack can be performed in
practice and allows to assess the deanonymization accuracy that it
is possible to achieve.
Summarizing, this work provides the following contributions:
• A methodology for deanonymizing apps on Android-based
smartphones behind Tor;
• A Proof-of-Concept that implements the deanonymization
methodology, which can be used to verify Tor’s vulnerability
to app deanonymization and assess the level of accuracy that
can be achieved;
• A dataset1 of generated Android Tor traffic traces that can
be used to check the validity of our Proof-of-Concept and
compare alternative methodologies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reports the related works. Section 3 presents the fundamental con-
cepts related to Tor and the machine learning algorithms employed
in this work. Section 4 introduces the threat model that we consider.
Section 5 discusses the methodology for deanonymizing Android
apps behind the Tor network. Section 6 describes the Proof-of-
Concept. Section 7 reports the experiment performed to evaluate
the accuracy of the methodology and discusses the obtained results.
Finally, in section 8 we draw some conclusion and discuss possible
future directions for this work.
2 RELATEDWORKS
Many works have been published in the broad area of traffic anal-
ysis both in the context of desktop environments and smartphone
environments (mostly assuming the Android operating system).
While, there are some works in the context of desktop environ-
ments that has focused on deanonymizing Tor traffic, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no work assuming both a smartphone
environment and that traffic is anonymized through Tor. Therefore,
there is no work we can directly compare to.
In this section we report the most related works considering a
desktop environment, with or without Tor anonymized traffic, and
an Android environment without Tor.
1Both the software necessary to reproduce the Proof-of-Concept and the dataset
can be downloaded from the following repository https://www.cis.uniroma1.it/
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2.1 Desktop environment without Tor
In the context of website fingerprinting, Hintz [19] proposes an
attack against SafeWeb, an encrypting web proxy, that allows to
determine the webpages visited by the users. The attack exploit
the fact that, even if traffic is encrypted, many web browser open
a separate TCP connection for downloading each resource in a
visited webpage. This allows an attacker to monitor the size of the
resources associated to a web page by analyzing the amount of
bytes transferred in the corresponding TCP connections. The set of
resources’ size are used to fingerprint webpages. The author also
proposes some protection mechanisms against this attack, such as
adding noise to traffic and using single connections to download
all the resources of a webpage.
Bissias et al. [12] propose a statistical website fingerprinting
attack. The attacker creates a profile of the target website by moni-
toring the distribution of packet sizes and inter-arrival times. These
data are then compared to user traffic. The authors show that the
attack achieve an accuracy of 23% on the entire dataset and an
accuracy of 40% on the set of top 25 most identifiable websites.
Liberatore et al. [23] describe a website fingerprinting attack
against HTTPS connections. They use unique packet lengths to
build profiles of HTTPS connections and compare them against a
dataset of known profiles using a naive Bayes classifier.
2.2 Desktop environment with Tor
In the context of Website fingerprinting, Wang et al. [34] propose
an attack that uses a k−Nearest Neighbor Classifier to effectively
fingerprint web pages behind Tor. They employ several types of
features, including general statistics about total traffic (total in-
coming/outgoing packets, total transmission time, etc.), unique
packet lengths, packet orderings, bursts (e.g., length of the first
100 burts, direction of the first 10 packets) and inter-packet times.
They show that their attack has significant higher accuracy than
previous attacks in the same field.
AlSabah et al. [10] propose a machine learning based approach
for Tor’s traffic classification. The aim of the work is to recognize
different classes of workloads that, in combination with QoS poli-
cies, can significantly improve the experience of Tor clients. Indeed,
as stated in the paper, most of the Tor’s traffic is interactive web
browsing but there is a small part of this traffic that consists of
bulk download. This is a problem for a network that tries to be
low-latency and that relies on a relatively small number of nodes.
However, since Tor’s traffic is encrypted, it is not possible to rely
on classical QoS to discriminate applications traffic. The proposed
technique achieve an accuracy higher than 95%.
Johnson et al. [20] analyze Tor security in real world. The au-
thors try to model various typical Tor users and examine different
types of adversary models over the Internet network. They define
a methodology and metrics to measure the security of users over
Tor.
Juarez et al. [21] analyzes the known website fingerprinting at-
tacks on Tor. Known attacks claim to be effective under precise
assumptions about threat model and user settings, which often do
not hold in practical scenarios. The authors conduct a critical eval-
uation of these attacks and show their weakness when performed
in real scenarios.
Chakravarty et al. [14] evaluates the feasibility and effectiveness
of practical traffic analysis attacks on the Tor network using Net-
Flow data. It is not a passive attack, authors deliberately alter traffic
characteristic at the server side and observe how this alteration
affects client side through a statistical correlation. They achieve
100% accuracy in laboratory tests, and 81.4% accuracy in real world
tests.
Ling et al. [24] propose TorWard, a system that attempts to
recognize malicious traffic over Tor. Indeed, Tor anonymity is often
abused to send malicious traffic (e.g., P2P botnets, trojan, etc.) with
the aim of bypassing traditional IDS. In their experiments they
found that a considerable portion of the Tor traffic is malicious
(around 10%) with 8.99% of the alerts generated due to malware
and 78.03% of the alerts generated due to malicious P2P traffic.
Mittal et al. [25] exploits throughput information to gain infor-
mation about the user. The attack can identify the Guard Node
(entry point to Tor network) and identify if two concurrent TCP
connections belong to the same user.
Habibi Lashkari et al. [18] focus on recognition of traffic types
instead of websites. They consider are 8 application traffic types:
browsing, email, chat, audio streaming, video streaming, file trans-
fer, VoIP and P2P. They perform network traffic analysis by splitting
the traffic traces in flows of a certain duration. For each flow they
compute several features based on inter-arrival times, active and
idle periods, packet rates and byte rates. They employ a supervised
machine learning approach to classify the traffic type of each flow.
In particular they explored k−Nearest Neighbor, Random Forest
and C4.5 classifiers.
2.3 Android environment without Tor
A number of authors have proposed various approaches to iden-
tify smartphone apps through network traffic analysis. Many of
these solutions focus on examining IP addresses and packet pay-
loads. However, relying on IP addresses is less effective because
a lot of applications exploit Content Delivery Network (CDN) for
scalability.
AppScanner [33] targets mobile environments and uses traffic
features to fingerprint mobile apps. They rely on a supervised
machine learning approach using only features that does not require
to inspect packet payloads, thus working also on encrypted traffic.
They perform experiments with SVM and Random Forest classifiers
achieving 99% of accuracy in their dataset with 110 of the most
popular apps in the Google Play Store.
Dai et al. [17] propose a technique for app fingerprinting based
on building network traffic profiles of apps. They run each app in
an emulator, exercising different execution paths through a novel
UI fuzzing technique, and collect the corresponding network traces.
They compute a fingerprint of the app by identifying invariants
in the generated network traces. Using the generated fingerprint
they were able to detect the presence of apps in real-world network
traffic logs from a cellular provider.
Conti et al. [15] describe amachine learning based network traffic
analysis approach to identify user actions on specific apps (facebook,
gmail and twitter). They achieve more than 95% of accuracy and
precision for most of the considered actions.
Stöber et al. [32] focuses on identifying smartphones from 3G/UMTS
data capture. Even if 3G/UMTS data is encrypted an attacker could
reliably identify a smartphone using only the information extracted
from periodic traffic patterns leak side-channel information like
timing and data volume. They show as by computing fingerprints
on 6 hours of background traffic sniffing, allows to reliably identify
a smartphone, with a success probability of 90%, with only about
15 minutes of traffic monitoring.
Saltaformaggio et al. [30] develop a tool called NetScope which is
able to detect user activities on both Android and iOS smartphones.
They compute feature by only inspecting the IP headers, and use a
SVM multi-class classifier to detect activities. NetScope achieves a
precision of 78.04% and a recall of 76.04% on average on a set of 35
widely used apps.
3 BACKGROUND ON TOR
In this section we briefly summarize the basic concepts about
the Tor network. Tor [29] is a distributed overlay network that
anonymizes TCP-based applications (web browsers, secure shell,
mail clients) while trying to keep the latency low. The network con-
sists of a set of interconnected entities called Onion Routers (ORs).
Tor clients, also known as Onion Proxies (OPs), periodically connect
to directory servers to download the list of available ORs. OPs use
this information to establish circuits in the Tor network, to connect
to a destination node (which is outside the Tor network). A circuit
is a path of ORs in which each OR knows only its predecessor and
its successor OR. A Tor circuit has three types of nodes:
• Entry or Guard Node: this represents the entry point to Tor
network for the Tor client.
• Relay Nodes: these are the intermediate ORs of the circuit.
• Exit Node: this is the last node in the Tor circuit. That is, the
one that connects to the destination.
Each Tor circuit must have one entry node, at least one relay
node (but there may be multiple) and one exit node. The entry node
is the only node in the circuit that knows the Tor client, while the
exit node is the only one that knows the destination.
Messages exchanged between the Tor client and the destination
are split into cells when they traverse the Tor network. Cells are
the basic unit of communication among Tor nodes. Tor cells used
to have a 512 bytes fixed size in earlier Tor versions. Though this
choice provided some resistance against traffic analysis, it was
inefficient and made Tor traffic easier to discover due to packet-
size distribution [29]. Therefore, variable length cells have been
introduced in newer Tor versions.
When establishing a circuit, the Tor client shares a symmetric
key with each node of the circuit. As shown in Figure 1, when the
Tor client sends a packet to the destination it encrypts the corre-
sponding cells’ payloads with all the shared keys, in reverse order
from the exit node to the entry node. Each node along the path
unwraps its layer using its key. Only the exit node can reconstruct
the the message to be sent to the destination in clear. On the op-
posite direction, when the destination sends a packet to the Tor
client, each node in the circuit encrypts the corresponding cells,
so that only the Tor client can reconstruct the original message by
decrypting the cells using all the shared keys in the order from the
entry to the exit node.
3.1 Padding
Internet service providers and surveillance infrastructures are known
to store metadata about connections. Routers supports metadata re-
tention through standard protocols (e.g., Netflow, jFlow, Netstream,
IPFIX, etc.) typically in the form of per-flow records, containing
at least the so called 5-tuple (consisting of the source IP address,
source port number, destination IP address, destination port num-
ber and protocol fields) and typically other information, such as the
amount of bytes sent/received. Collecting and analyzing such data
is useful for characterizing traffic, but may also represent a threat
to anonymity.
Per-flow records are emitted by routers on a periodic basis de-
pending on two configurable timeouts: active flow timeout and the
inactive flow timeout. The expiration of the active flow timeout
causes routers to emit a new record for each active connection. The
inactive flow timeout causes the emission of a new record when a
connection is inactive for a certain amount of time. The value of
such timeouts is configurable and the range depends on routers
vendors, but active flow timeout is typically in the order of minutes,
while the inactive flow timeout in the order of tens of seconds.
Therefore, the aggregation level of records data (on a temporal
basis) is at least the active flow timeout, but may be finer when
there are inactive periods longer than the inactive flow timeout.
Thus, to reduce the granularity level of records’ data (with the
aim of hindering deanonymization techniques based on traffic analy-
sis), long inactive periods should be avoided. For this reason, the Tor
protocol introduced connection padding. With connection padding,
special purpose cells (PADDING cells) are sent if the connection is
inactive for a given amount of time, so as to reduce the duration of
inactive periods.
3.1.1 Connection Padding. Connection padding cells are exchanged
only between the Tor client and entry node. No other nodes in
the circuit are involved. To determine when to send a connection
padding cell, both the Tor client and the entry node maintain a
timer. These timers are set up with a timeout value between 1.5
and 9.5 seconds. The exact value depends on a function that sam-
ples a distribution described in [27]. After the establishment of the
Tor circuit the timers start on both sides, if any of the two timers
expires, a padding cell is sent to the other endpoint. Exchanging
any cell different from a padding cell resets the timers.
3.1.2 Reduced Connection Padding. Connection padding intro-
duces an overhead in terms of exchanged data. Especially in mobile
environments, where clients usually have limited data plan and
reducing traffic helps saving battery life, this overhead may be-
come excessive. Therefore, reduced connection padding has been
introduced to lower the overhead due to connection padding. With
reduced connection padding the timeout is sampled from a dif-
ferent range, between 9 seconds to 14 seconds. This results in a
less frequent exchange of padding cells with respect to connection
padding.
4 THREAT MODEL
In our threat model an attacker wants to deanonimize the apps on a
target smartphone that uses Tor. That is, he/she wants to recognize
which apps are being used by the target smartphone at any given
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Figure 1: Cell encryption along the circuit from source to destination.
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Figure 2: The attacker is able to passively capture the traffic
from the target smartphone and the Internet access point
(either Wi-Fi AP, or cellular base station).
time.We assume that the target is connected to the Internet through
a wireless access point, either via a Wi-Fi LAN or via the cellular
WAN, and that the attacker is able to passively capture the traffic
between the target and the access point (see Figure 2). For example,
the attacker could be the controller of the Wi-Fi Access Point or
the Base Station the target is connected to. We assume that the Tor
client (i.e., an Onion Proxy) is installed in the smartphone itself and
all apps’ traffic passes through the Tor client.
5 DEANONYMIZATION METHODOLOGY
Figure 3 shows an overview of our methodology for deanonymiz-
ing Android apps behaind Tor. The assumption at the basis of the
methodology is that different apps produce different network traf-
fic patterns, which are discernible, through proper network traffic
analysis, even when the traffic is anonymized through Tor.
The methodology rely on a machine learning based network
traffic analysis and consists of two distinct phases:
• Training Phase: during which we build a machine learning
model of the distinctive characteristics of apps’ Tor traffic.
This is the preparation phase of the attack.
• Deanonymization Phase: during which we conduct the actual
attack against the target, by monitoring the target’s traffic
and using the model built in the previous phase to recognize
which apps the victim is using.
In the next sections, we will describe each phase into details.
5.1 Training Phase
During the training phase we build a machine learning model of
how different apps produce Tor traffic. We assume that the at-
tacker is interested in recognizing a predefined set of apps C =
{app1, . . . ,appn }. If the target is using an app which is not included
in C, our methodology will not be able to recognize that app.
The left part of Figure 3 shows the logical blocks of the training
phase. In the following sections we describe each logical block in
details.
5.1.1 Training Traffic Gathering. Since we assume a supervised
learning process the first step is collecting a training dataset. In
particular, the very first step requires to gather, for each app in
C, raw Tor traffic traces (e.g. PCAP files [3]). These traces can be
picked from public datasets, if available (such as the one that we
made available with this work), or can be generated synthetically, as
described in section 6.1.1. The output of this step is a set of network
traffic traces for each app in C.
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Figure 3: Overview of the deanonymization methodology.
5.1.2 Preprocessing and Feature Extraction Module. This module
processes the network traces gathered at the previous step and
extract the features that will be fed to the machine learning training
algorithm.
Preprocessing. For each network trace, we sort all TCP sessions
(note that Tor only supports TCP) and we split sessions into flows.
A flow is a portion of a TCP session of a predefined fixed duration
TF , the flow timeout. We split each TCP sessions into flows of TF
seconds. When, we find a TCP packet with the FIN flag set, we
stop splitting. Thus, the last flow of each TCP connection may ac-
tually last less than TF seconds. The flow timeout is a configurable
parameter of our methodology that has an impact on the deanony-
mization accuracy. As detailed later, in section 7.1, we performed
experiments with TF = 10 and TF = 15. The experiments with
TF = 10 yielded slightly better results.
Once we have split all traces into flows, we label each flow with
the app in C that has generated the corresponding traffic. Therefore,
the output of the preprocessing step is a labeled dataset of flows.
Feature Extraction. For each flow xi we compute a vector of fea-
tures vi = (f1(xi ), . . . , fm (xi )) and we assign it the corresponding
label appj ∈ C. Section 6.3 reports the set of features that we em-
ployed in our Proof-of-Work. The general methodology does not
rely on a particular set of features. However, as always, the choice of
such set strongly impacts on accuracy. Our set of features has been
derived from an experimental analysis involving various feature
sets.
Since many machine learning algorithms (e.g., SVM and k−NN)
work best with standardized features, for each component yi,k =
fk (xi ) (of each feature vector) we compute its standard score as:
zi,k =
yi,k − µk
σk
where, µk and σk are, respectively, the mean and standard deviation
of feature fk computed over the dataset. The output is the training
set, which is the dataset of labeled standardized feature vectors.
5.1.3 Machine Learning Model Training. During this step we feed
the machine learning training algorithm with the training set build
in the previous step. The output is the trained model. Our method-
ology does not rely on a particular machine learning model, but
assumes a generic multi-class classifier whose set of classes is the
set of apps C. In our experiments we tested three different classi-
fiers based on, respectively, Random Forest, k−Nearest Neighbors
and SVM.
5.2 Deanonymization Phase
In the deanonymization phase the actual attack against the target
is performed. The deanonymization phase consists of two logically
distinct stages: amonitoring stage, during which we sniff the target’s
network traffic, and a classification stage, during which process the
traces and output the classification. In our Proof-of-Concept we
adopt an offline approach. That is, the two stages are not concurrent,
they are performed subsequently. We first perform monitoring,
collecting enough traces, and then we perform the classification.
However, our methodology is general enough to allow for an online
implementation, in which the two stages are actually executed
simultaneously, and a new processing and classification step is
performed as soon as the corresponding data is available.
The logical blocks of the deanonymization phase are shown in
the right part of Figure 3. In the following sections we discuss each
logical block in details.
5.2.1 Target Traffic Sniffing. The first step of the deanonymization
methodology requires the attacker to passively capture the target’s
network traffic. Our threat model assumes that the attacker has the
means to do so. For example, the attacker may be the controller of
the wireless access point the target is connected to. The output of
this stage consists of the raw network traces.
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5.2.2 Preprocessing and Feature Extraction Module. This module is
exactly the same as the one already described in the training stage
section (see 5.1.2), with the only exception that in this case the
traces and thus the corresponding feature vectors are not labeled.
Also the µk and σk parameters used to standardize the features are
those computed during the training phase (i.e., on the training set).
Thus, this module processes the traces coming from the previous
step and outputs the corresponding (unlabeled) standardized feature
vectors.
5.2.3 Classifier. In this step, each feature vector coming from the
previous step is directly fed to the classifier that has been trained
during the training stage. For each feature vector the classifier out-
puts a class, namely one of the apps in C. The output of the classifier
is also the output of the methodology, i.e., the deanonymized apps.
6 PROOF-OF-CONCEPT
This section presents our Proof-of-Concept implementing themethod-
ology described in the previous section. In the next sections we
will describe the setup and the main logical blocks of the Proof-of-
Concept. Then, we will discuss their implementation. Finally, we
will describe the set of features that we employ and the datasets
that we built.
6.1 Setup
For our proof-of-concept we built the setup shown in Figure 4. The
target smartphone connects to the Internet through a Wireless
router. The router is connected to a workstation. The latter is used
to configure the router to capture the traffic of the target, and to run
the preprocessing, feature extraction and machine learning tasks.
The router that we employed is a Xiaomi MiWiFi Nano running
LEDE [1]. We performed experiments with two target smartphones:
a Motorola Moto G running its stock version of Android 6.0 and a
Samsung Galaxy Nexus running LineageOS a mobile OS based on
Android 6.0. On both smartphones we use Orbot [2], a proxy app
that allows to use Tor on Android. The workstation is a standard
PC.
In the next sections we will discuss the main logical blocks of
the Proof-of-Concept.
6.1.1 Dataset Generation. Since, to the best of our knowledge,
there are no publicly available datasets collecting Android Tor’s
traces, we generated our own datasets. The basis of the dataset
generation is the User Simulation block shown in Figure 4. For each
app in C, this block starts the app on the target smarphone and
exercises it by simulating a user interaction with the app, so that it
starts to generate a synthetic, yet as realistic as possible, network
trace. The router captures the traffic and stores it in a set of files
through the Traffic Sniffer module. This dataset is then split into a
training set and a test set.
6.1.2 Processing and Feature Extraction Module. The Processing
and Feature Extraction module of our methodology is implemented
in the workstation. During the training stage it processes the train-
ing set and assign the labels registered by the User Simulation
module to feature vectors, as shown in Figure 4. During the deanon-
ymization phase, the testing set is processed by the same module.
6.1.3 Machine Learning Module. The machine learning module is
installed in the workstation. During the training stage it processes
the training set of labeled feature vectors and outputs the trained
model, as shown in Figure 4. During the deanonymization phase, it
uses the trained model to classify each feature vectors.
We tested three different classifiers, using RandomForest,k−Nearest
Neighbor and SVM. We performed the Stratified k-Fold Cross Vali-
dation [22] during training.
6.2 Implementation
In this section we discuss the implementation of the modules de-
scribed in section 6.1.
6.2.1 User Simulation. The User Simulation module has been im-
plemented through AndroidViewClient [4] a python library that
helps scripting Android apps GUI exercisers. Moreover, we em-
ployed Culebra GUI and CulebraTester [5]. These tools record the
actions performed by a real user on an Android device and con-
vert them in a script to reproduce them. Culebra GUI can produce
python scripts that are compatible with AndroidViewClient. We
employed these tools mainly to identify the correct UI elements to
interact with, for each app. Then, we elaborated different simulation
scripts for each app, depending on their typical use. We reported
the details about simulation of the various apps in appendix A.
6.2.2 Traffic Sniffer. The traffic sniffer is implemented by running
Tcpdump [3] on the router, to capture network traffic, and Wire-
shark [9] on the workstation for simple network analysis.
6.2.3 Preprocessing and Feature Extraction Module. The prepro-
cessing and feature extraction module has been implemented from
scratch as a set of python scripts processing the traces PCAP files,
splitting the TCP sessions into flows and extracting the features on
them.
6.2.4 Machine Learning module. The machine learning module has
been implemented through Scikit-Learn [26], a well-known python
library that implements many machine learning algorithms.
6.3 Features
In our Proof-of-Concept we employed 3 types of features. In the
following we describe all the features that we used.
6.3.1 Time-based Features. Since Tor’s relay cells (those that trans-
port the actual payload) are fixed sized, initially we concentrated on
time-based, rather than size-based features. Indeed, since Tor aims
to be a low-latency network, it does not introduce random delays
when routing packets. Thus, time-based features appear to be a
good candidate to characterize apps traffic over Tor. In particular,
we employed the following features, given that they led to good
results in the context of recognition of traffic classes in desktop
environments [18]:
• FIAT (Forward Inter Arrival Time): time between two out-
going packets;
• BIAT (Backward Inter Arrival Time): time between two in-
coming packets;
• FLOWIAT (Flow Inter Arrival Time): time between two pack-
ets, no matter the direction;
• Active time: amount of time a flow is active;
• Idle time: amount of time a flow is idle;
• Flow bytes per second: number of bytes per second;
• Flow packets per second: number of packets per second;
• Duration: duration of the flow in seconds.
For all the above features except the last three, we actually com-
pute 4 statistical values: minimum, maximum, mean and standard
deviation. Moreover, the active and idle time depends on a con-
figurable threshold, the activity timeout TA. We performed experi-
ments with TA = 2 and TA = 5 seconds.
6.3.2 Packet Direction and Burst Features. Packet direction and
burst features have also been proven to be effective in the context
of website fingerprinting on desktop environments [34]. Packet
direction indicates whether a packet is going forward, from the
source (the Tor client) to the destination, or backward, i.e., in the
opposite direction. A burst instead is an uninterrupted sequence of
packets in the same direction. After a preliminary visual analysis,
with the Wireshark [9] tool, we observed distinctive patterns, in
terms of bursts, in the network traces of the various apps. Therefore
we decided to enrich our feature set with the following features:
• Direction of the first 10 packets (of the flow);
• Incoming Bursts: number of bursts, bursts mean length,
length of the longest burst;
• Outgoing Bursts: number of bursts, bursts mean length,
length of the longest burst;
• Lengths of the first 10 incoming bursts;
• Lengths of the first 10 outgoing bursts.
6.3.3 Size-based Features. Event though relay cells are fixed sized,
Tor uses variable-length cells primarily used for traffic control. As
a preliminary analysis, we counted the number of packets for each
packet size and we observed that, while there is a high variability
of packet sizes, there is a relatively small set of packet sizes that
accounts for most of the traffic. Thus, we decided to introduce a
feature for each of the ten most frequent packet sizes. These, were
(in order of higher frequency) 1500, 595, 583, 2960, 1097, 1384, 151,
1126, 1109 and 233 bytes. We soon decided to discard size 2960, as
this exceeds the MTU (1500 byes) and thus represents a reassembled
packet. Each feature is a counter of the number of packets of that
size observed in the flow.
6.4 Datasets
We collected two datasets of network traces:
• Reduced Connection Padding Dataset: 11.24 GB of traces col-
lected with the reduced connection padding activated (see
section 3.1.2), which is the default configuration on Orbot.
• Full Connection Padding Dataset: 9.84 GB of traces collected
with the (full) connection padding activated (see section 3.1.1).
Both datasets consists of a set of PCAP files [3] containing the
raw captured packets. In both datasets we collected about 4 hours
of network traffic for each of the following apps: Dailimotion, Face-
book, Instagram, Replaio Radio, Skype, Spotify, TorBrowser Alpha,
Twitch, uTorrent, YouTube.
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section reports the experimental evaluation that we carried out
to asses the accuracy of the methodology in deanonymizing apps.
In section 7.1 we introduce the experiments that we performed.
In section 7.2 we discuss the evaluation methodology. Finally, in
section 7.3 we present and comment the obtained results.
7.1 Experiments
We performed several experiments using the prototype implementa-
tion of our methodology described in the Proof-of-Concept section
(see section 6).
For each experiment we vary the following settings:
• Tor’s connection padding: Reduced or Full, depending on
whether we use the dataset with reduced connection padding
or full connection padding (see section 6.4);
• Flow Timeout (TF ): either 10 or 15 seconds (see section 5.1.2);
• Activity Timeout (TA): either 2 or 5 seconds (see section 6.3);
• Presence of the Web Browser app: Yes/No.
In particular, the last setting indicates whether the traces related to
the usage of the web browser app are included in the experiment’s
dataset or not. The choice of performing experiments for both cases
is motivated by the fact that, according to our experiments, the
web browser app seems to be the most difficult to recognize among
those that we tested, and significantly reduces the accuracy of the
methodology. Therefore, we show the accuracy that can be achieved
in both cases, by including or by ignoring such app.
Moreover, in each experiment we tested the performance of three
different classifiers: Random Forest [13], k−Nearest Neighbors (k-
NN) [11] and C-SVM classifier (SVC) [16].
Table 1 summarizes the complete set of experiments that we
performed and their settings.
Table 1: The complete set of performed experiments (Flow
Timeout and Activity Timeout are in seconds).
Experiment ConnectionPadding
Flow
Timeout
Activity
Timeout
Web
Browser
Experiment 1 Reduced 10 2 Yes
Experiment 2 Reduced 10 2 No
Experiment 3 Full 10 2 Yes
Experiment 4 Full 10 2 No
Experiment 5 Reduced 10 5 Yes
Experiment 6 Reduced 10 5 No
Experiment 7 Full 10 5 Yes
Experiment 8 Full 10 5 No
Experiment 9 Reduced 15 2 Yes
Experiment 10 Reduced 15 2 No
Experiment 11 Full 15 2 Yes
Experiment 12 Full 15 2 No
Experiment 13 Reduced 15 5 Yes
Experiment 14 Reduced 15 5 No
Experiment 15 Full 15 5 Yes
Experiment 16 Full 15 5 No
Table 2: Per-class performance metrics, where
TPi ,TNi , FPi , FNi are, respectively, the number of true
positives, true negatives, false positives and false negatives
of class i.
Measure Formula
Precisioni T PiT Pi+F Pi
Recalli T PiT Pi+FNi
F1 Scorei 2 Precisioni ·RecalliPrecisioni+Recalli
Accuracyi T Pi+T NiT Pi+F Pi+T Ni+FNi
7.2 Evaluation Methodology
For each experiment we evaluate the performance achieved by our
Proof-of-Concept, namely the performance of the classifier. We
asses both the overall performance of the classifier and the perfor-
mance achieved on a per-class basis, so as to highlight whether
some apps are more easily recognized than others.
The per-class performance are computed in terms of precision,
recall, F1 score and accuracy computed for each class in C. The
formulas employed to compute such metrics are reported in Table 2.
The overall classifier performance are computed by averaging
the per-class metrics. Note that precision, recall and F1 score are
averaged according to two criteria: micro and macro. The two cri-
teria account differently for imbalances in the dataset (i.e., uneven
proportion of samples per classes). The micro criteria biases the
corresponding metrics towards the most populated classes, while
the macro criteria treats all classes equally [31]. The formulas em-
ployed to compute such metrics are reported in Table 3. Note, that
Table 3: Overall classifier performance measures, where
TPi ,TNi , FPi , FNi are, respectively, the number of true pos-
itives, true negatives, false positives and false negatives of
class i, and n is the total number of classes.
Measure Formula
Micro Precision
∑
i T Pi∑
i (T Pi+F Pi )
Micro Recall
∑
i T Pi∑
i (T Pi+FNi )
Micro F1 Score 2 MicroPrecision ·MicroRecallMicroPrecision+MicroRecall
Macro Precision
∑
i
T Pi
T Pi +FPi
n =
∑
i Precisioni
n
Macro Recall
∑
i
T Pi
T Pi +FNi
n =
∑
i Recalli
n
Macro F1 Score 2 MacroPrecision ·MacroRecallMacroPrecision+MacroRecall
Average Accuracy
∑
i
T Pi +TNi
T Pi +FPi +TNi +FNi
n =
∑
i Accuracyi
n
Error Rate
∑
i
F Pi +FNi
T Pi +FPi +TNi +FNi
n
micro precision and micro recall (and thus micro F1 score), are
mathematically equivalent. Thus, when presenting the results of
the experiments we will only report the micro F1 score.
Formulas in Tables 3 and 2 are defined in terms of the number
of true positives, false positives, true negatives and false negatives.
These are defined as follows. Let v̂i be the standardized feature
vector of flow xi . Let c ∈ C be the actual class of vˆi , that is, the one
corresponding to the app that generated the traffic of flow xi . Let
c ∈ C be the app that is output by the classifier. Then:
• TPi : number of feature vectors for which c = c = appi ;
• FPi : number of feature vectors for which c = appi and c ,
appi ;
• TNi : number of feature vectors for which c , appi and
c , appi ;
• FNi : number of feature vectors for which c , appi and
c = appi ;
7.3 Results
In this section we present the results of the experimental evaluation.
As already stated, for ease of presentation, we only discuss the
experiments corresponding to the combination of the Flow and
Activity Timeout parameters that yielded the best results. Namely,
experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4. The results of the other experiments
are reported for completeness in the appendix B. In the following
sections we present and comment the results of experiments 1-4,
while in section 7.3.5 we summarizes the overall results and draw
the conclusions of the experimental evaluation.
7.3.1 Experiment 1. This experiment is performed on the Reduced
Connection Padding Dataset, withTF = 10 andTA = 2, and includes
the Tor Browser app. Figure 5 shows the overall performance of
the three classifiers. We achieved the best performance with the
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Figure 5: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 1.
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Figure 6: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 2.
Random Forest classifier (with respect to all metrics). In particular,
Random Forest achieves an accuracy of 0.968 and an error rate
of 0.032 with a (macro) F1 score of 0.83. With k-NN we obtained
the worst results, while SVC performs slightly worse than Random
Forest.
Table 4 reports the per-class performance metrics. For all classi-
fiers, we observe a certain variability in how accurate the classifier
is in recognizing the various apps. Looking at the F1 score, Spotify,
Tor Browser and YouTube appear to be the most difficult apps to
recognize. Indeed, by looking directly at the data, we observed that
these three apps are often confused, one for another. Since both
Spotify and YouTube provide streaming contents, they probably
generate too similar traffic patterns sometimes, that mislead the
classifiers. The same reasoning probably applies to Tor Browser.
Indeed, when visiting websites providing streaming contents, this
app may be confused with a app such as YouTube or Spotify. Indeed,
webpages may embed streaming content, including YouTube videos
themselves.
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Figure 7: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 3.
7.3.2 Experiment 2. This experiment is performed on the same
dataset as Experiment 1 (Reduced Connection Padding Dataset),
with the same parameters (TF = 10 and TA = 2), but does not in-
clude the Tor Browser app. Figure 6 shows the overall performance
of the three classifiers. Same as Experiment 1, the best performance
have been obtained with the Random Forest classifier. This clas-
sifier achieved 0.969 accuracy, with an error rate of 0.031 and a
(macro) F1 score of 0.855. Also in this case k-NN performed the
worst, while SVC achieved better results. In this experiment we
obtained better overall performance than in Experiment 1. This is
due to the fact that, as already pointed out, the Tor Browser app is
often misclassified due to its variability in usage patterns. Thus, by
not considering it all classifiers make less mistakes.
The per-class performance metrics are reported Table 6. Looking
at the F1 score, we observe that, similarly to Experiment 1, the
apps for which we achieve the worst performance are Spotify and
YouTube. This, again, is due to the fact that they are often confused
one for the other. However, with respect to Experiment 1 all metrics
increases for both apps. This is due to the fact that they were often
misclassified as Tor Browser.
7.3.3 Experiment 3. This experiment is performed on the Full Con-
nection Padding Dataset, with TF = 10 and TA = 2, and includes
the Tor Browser app. As in the previous two experiments, Random
Forest gave the best results, followed by SVC and k-NN. The accu-
racy achieved through Random Forest is 0.972, with an error rate
of 0.028 and a (macro) F1 score of 0.853.
Table 6 summarizes the per-class results. Differently from Exper-
iments 1 and 2, by looking at the F1 score, we observe that the apps
that mislead the classifiers the most are Facebook, Instagram and
Tor Browser. This is not surprising. Indeed, if we think of the typical
usage patterns of the apps that we considered in our experiments,
Facebook, Instagram and Tor Browser are the ones with the highest
idle periods (the user “think time”), as opposed to the other apps,
that mainly provide streaming content (typically, with less frequent
and shorter idle periods). Since the connection padding mechanism
is activated by idle periods, it is normal to observe a performance
Table 4: Per-class performance of each classifier for Experiment 1.
Random Forest k−NN SVC
APP PR. REC. F1 ACC. PR. REC. F1 ACC. PR. REC. F1 ACC.
dailymotion 0.83 0.77 0.8 0.96 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.91 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.95
facebook 0.9 0.84 0.87 0.98 0.62 0.7 0.66 0.94 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.97
instagram 0.79 0.86 0.82 0.94 0.58 0.67 0.62 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.8 0.94
replaio_radio 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.0 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99
skype 0.99 0.96 0.97 1.0 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.99
spotify 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.94 0.56 0.48 0.52 0.92 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.93
torbrowser_alpha 0.68 0.77 0.72 0.97 0.6 0.47 0.53 0.95 0.67 0.71 0.69 0.96
twitch 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.97 0.68 0.76 0.71 0.93 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.96
utorrent 0.9 0.91 0.9 0.98 0.82 0.69 0.75 0.96 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.97
youtube 0.76 0.69 0.72 0.95 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.93 0.72 0.63 0.67 0.95
Table 5: Per-class performance of each classifier for Experiment 2.
Random Forest k−NN SVC
APP PR. REC. F1 ACC. PR. REC. F1 ACC. PR. REC. F1 ACC.
dailymotion 0.83 0.78 0.8 0.96 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.9 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.94
facebook 0.9 0.84 0.87 0.98 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.94 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.97
instagram 0.79 0.87 0.83 0.94 0.6 0.67 0.63 0.88 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.93
replaio_radio 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.0 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99
skype 0.99 0.96 0.98 1.0 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.99
spotify 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.55 0.92 0.67 0.72 0.69 0.94
twitch 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.97 0.68 0.76 0.72 0.93 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.96
utorrent 0.9 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.83 0.71 0.77 0.96 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.97
youtube 0.77 0.71 0.74 0.95 0.63 0.56 0.59 0.93 0.73 0.66 0.69 0.95
Table 6: Per-class performance of each classifier for Experiment 3.
Random Forest k−NN SVC
APP PR. REC. F1 ACC. PR. REC. F1 ACC. PR. REC. F1 ACC.
dailymotion 0.87 0.81 0.84 0.97 0.66 0.72 0.69 0.95 0.8 0.77 0.78 0.97
facebook 0.78 0.72 0.75 0.96 0.48 0.52 0.5 0.91 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.95
instagram 0.72 0.7 0.71 0.94 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.89 0.67 0.7 0.68 0.93
replaio_radio 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.99
skype 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.99
spotify 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.96 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.93 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.95
torbrowser_alpha 0.81 0.69 0.75 0.97 0.64 0.35 0.45 0.94 0.78 0.67 0.72 0.97
twitch 0.86 0.92 0.89 0.98 0.68 0.77 0.72 0.94 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.97
utorrent 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.0 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.0
youtube 0.79 0.88 0.83 0.96 0.68 0.65 0.66 0.92 0.79 0.82 0.8 0.95
degradation when using full connection padding rather than the
reduced one.
7.3.4 Experiment 4. This experiment is performed on the same
dataset as Experiment 3 (Full Connection Padding Dataset), with
the same parameters (TF = 10 and TA = 2), but does not include
the Tor Browser app. As in all other experiments, Random Forest
provided the best results, while k-NN performed the worst. With
Random Forest we obtained an accuracy of 0.973, an error rate of
0.0268 and a (macro) F1 score of 0.875.
Table 6 summarizes the per-class results. The same considera-
tionsmade for Experiment 3 holds for Experiment 4. That is, looking
at the F1 score, Facebook and Instagram are the apps that hinders
all classifiers the most. Since we excluded the Tor Browser app, we
notice a general improvement of the performance. This, again, is
due to the fact that this app is particularly difficult to discern from
other apps.
7.3.5 Results Summary. In all experiments we achieved the best re-
sults with the Random Forest classifier. Table 8 shows a comparison
of the results obtained in each experiment through this classifier.
In all experiments we obtained comparable accuracy (∼ 0.97). As
expected, all performance metrics slightly improve when we do
not consider the Tor Browser app. Indeed, the type of the visited
Table 7: Per-class performance of each classifier for Experiment 4.
Random Forest k−NN SVC
APP PR. REC. F1 ACC. PR. REC. F1 ACC. PR. REC. F1 ACC.
dailymotion 0.88 0.82 0.85 0.97 0.67 0.71 0.69 0.94 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.96
facebook 0.82 0.73 0.77 0.96 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.91 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.95
instagram 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.94 0.51 0.49 0.5 0.89 0.69 0.7 0.69 0.93
replaio_radio 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.99
skype 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.99
spotify 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.97 0.73 0.69 0.71 0.94 0.8 0.81 0.8 0.95
twitch 0.87 0.92 0.9 0.98 0.71 0.77 0.74 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.97
utorrent 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.0 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.0
youtube 0.81 0.88 0.84 0.96 0.71 0.65 0.68 0.92 0.8 0.83 0.81 0.95
Table 8: Summary of the results of Experiments 1-4.
Experiment Avg. Accuracy Error Rate Micro F1 score Macro Precision Macro Recall Macro F1 score
Experiment 1 0.968 0.032 0.840 0.834 0.830 0.832
Experiment 2 0.969 0.031 0.859 0.859 0.852 0.855
Experiment 3 0.972 0.028 0.861 0.857 0.849 0.853
Experiment 4 0.973 0.0268 0.880 0.877 0.872 0.875
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Figure 8: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 4.
website strongly impact on the characteristics of the generated traf-
fic, which makes this app sometimes be confused with other apps.
For example, when visiting a webpage with streaming content the
Tor Browser app might be confused with a streaming app (such as
Spotify or YouTube).
A counterintuitive result that we obtained is that apparently
the use of Tor’s (full) connection padding actually improved the
accuracy over the use reduced connection padding. If we look at
the per-class results (Tables 4-7) we notice that the performance on
Facebook and Instagram apps actually worsen significantly. Also
the recall of the Tor Browser app worsen significantly, though its
precision improves, which means that the proportion of false nega-
tives increases (the app is more often confused with others), while
the number of false positives decreases (other apps are less fre-
quently confused with Tor Browser). The fact that these three apps
are more often misclassified when using full padding is what we
expected. Indeed, as already pointed out, their typical use patterns
involve more frequent “think times” and, thus, idle periods, which
trigger the connection padding mechanism. On the other hand, the
other apps are mainly characterized by a “streaming” pattern, thus
involving extremely less frequent idle periods, which explains why
for the majority of them the performance does not worsen. How-
ever, it does not explain why they improve. Clearly, the padding
mechanism has a strong impact on the time-based features (see
section 6.3), especially the active/idle time. Our guess is that the full
padding mechanism is actually activated statistically more often
for some of these streaming apps and less often for others, which
actually results in a better separation of the corresponding classes.
We plan to better investigate this aspect as future work.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work we have shown that Tor is vulnerable to app deanony-
mization. We described a general methodology to perform an attack
against a target smartphone which allows to unveil which app the
victim is using. The proposed methodology performs network traf-
fic analysis based on a supervised machine learning approach. It
leverages the fact that different apps produce different recognizable
traffic patterns even when protected by Tor. We also provided a
Proof-of-Concept that implements the methodology, that we em-
ployed to assess the accuracy that it can achieve in deanonymizing
apps. We performed several experiments achieving an accuracy
of 97.3% and a F1 score of 87.5%. We made the software of the
Proof-of-Concept, as well as the datasets that we built during the
experiments, publicly available, so that it can be used to assess Tor’s
vulnerability to this attack, compare alternative methodologies and
test possible countermeasures.
As future work we plan to experiment with additional machine
learning algorithms. Moreover, in this work we adopted a multi-
class classifier approach. That is, we trained a single classifier on
all possible classes. We plan to extend our experimental evaluation
by testing alternative binary-class approaches (such as one-vs-all
and one-vs-one), in which we employ several binary classifiers in
place of a single multi-class classifier. Another improvement to this
work may be to enlarge the datasets with a richer set of apps.
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A USER SIMULATION
This section describes how we simulated the user interaction in our
Proof-of-Work.
A.1 Tor Browser
The user activity on the Tor Browser app has been simulated
through a python script that visits webpages randomly sampled
from a list of the top 10,000 sites extracted from the Majestic Million
dataset [6]. The script spend a randomly drawn amount of time on
each webpage, before navigating to the next one.
A.2 Instagram
To simulate the user interaction with Instagram, we created a new
account and added the Socialblade’s top 500 most followed pro-
files [7]. The simulation script generates random swipe inputs on
the Instagram app to scroll the main page up and downwith random
delays. Swipe down inputs are generated with higher probability
than swipe up inputs, as a user browsing Instagram posts would
typically scroll the page from top to bottom. After a random number
of swipes there is a 30% probability that the user decides to visit
another random profile, or otherwise a 30% probability that the
user will push the like button on the current Instagram post.
A.3 Facebook
The simulation of the user interaction with the Facebook app is
very similar to that of Instagram. First we create a Facebook ac-
count for the user and we add a list of followed pages derived from
Socialblade’s top 500 most liked Facebook Pages [8]. Similarly to
that of Instagram, the simulation script scrolls the posts in the main
page of the Facebook app, by generating random swipe inputs with
random delays. After a random number of swipes there is a 30%
probability that the user pushes the like button on the post showing
on the screen.
A.4 Skype
Skype calls have been generated by starting calls with an audio
source near the smartphone microphone.
A.5 uTorrent
The uTorrent app is a Torrent client and, therefore, it does not
require a complex user interaction. We simply add some torrent
file to the app, and it starts the download.
A.6 Dailymotion, Replaio Radio, Spotify,
Twitch, YouTube
Also this apps do not require a very complex interaction with the
user. We start each app on some streaming content and leave the
app in execution.
B OTHER EXPERIMENTS RESULTS
This section reports the results of Experiments 5-16 which comple-
ments the results of the Experiments 1-4 discussed in section 7.3.
The results are summarized by Figures 9-20.
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Figure 9: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 5.
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Figure 10: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 6.
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Figure 11: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 7.
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Figure 12: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 8.
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Figure 13: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 9.
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Figure 14: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 10.
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Figure 15: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 11.
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Figure 16: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 12.
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Figure 17: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 13.
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Figure 18: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 14.
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Figure 19: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 15.
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Figure 20: Classifiers’ overall performance for Experiment 16.
